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SPECIAL DAMAGES
R. M. Van Steenberg*
I. INTRODUCTION
Special damages have been defined as those which are the
actual, but not 'the necessary result of the injury complained of,
and which in fact follow it as a natural and proximate consequence
in the particular case, that is, by reason of special circumstances
or conditions as distinguished from general damages which the
law itself implies or presumes to have accrued from the wrong
for which complaint is made. Hence special damages are such
as did in fact accrue to the particular individual by reason of the
particular circumstances of the case but which the law does not
necessarily imply as distinguished from general damages which
are such as might accrue to any person similarly injured. From
a practical standpoint the distinction between the two types of
damages is important in Nebraska as well as most other states
because of the necessity of specifically pleading and proving
special damages whereas this is generally not necessary as to
general damages.
In ascertaining whether specific damages are recoverable in
this field, the Nebraska attorney is faced with a research problem
of considerable scope, for the Nebraska Supreme Court has not
often ruled on many of the categories of special damages.' It is the
purpose of this comment to review a few of the major categories
of special damages, compiling, so far as possible, the present law
of Nebraska concerning each.
II. MEDICAL BILLS - GENERALLY
A. PHYSICIAN AND HospITAL.
It has always been held in Nebraska that medical and hos-
pital bills are recoverable in a personal injury action. The prob-
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i The author believes the reason for this lack of judicial decision is
historical. At the time the Supreme Court of Nebraska began trying
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lem has always been the quantum of proof necessary to sanction
recovery.
In Oliverius v. Wicks, 2 decided in 1922, the Supreme Court
of Nebraska held that, where there was no evidence introduced
touching the fair and reasonable value of the services of a hos-
pital or physician, the singular testimony of the plaintiff that
he had paid a specified amount was an insufficient basis for per-
mitting the jury to assess a value. In so holding, the court stated:
Service such as these are of a peculiar kind, and we do
not think that the jury could, without the aid of testimony, have
formed a reliable opinion as to their value.3
The Oliverius Case was not cited again until 1953, when the court
held that the same rule applied to funeral expenses; that a re-
ceipted bill of an undertaker did not, in itself, constitute suf-
ficient proof of value to be admissible over objection.4
However, in Shields v. Buffalo Co.,5 decided in 1955, the Court
softened the "Proof of Reasonableness" rule somewhat, stating:
If proof is offered of what was paid for materials furnished
and services rendered in conducting a funeral, and no objection
is made thereto on the ground that the amount so paid is not
the proper basis for recovery, it will be presumed that objection
thereto on that basis is waived and that the amount so paid is the
fair and reasonable value thereof.6
A number of state courts, and the Federal Courts, are even
more liberal, holding that proof of expenses for medical or sur-
gical treatment for personal injuries is presumptive evidence of
the reasonable value of the services if unreasonableness in the
amount does not appear from other evidence.7
As a practical matter, it would appear that the problem of
proof of medical and hospital bills should, in most cases, be vir-
cases, many of the general rules regarding special damages had be-
come so well established in other jurisdictions that they were already
considered academic and, hence, unworthy of further litigation.
2 107 Neb. 821, 187 N.W. 73 (1922).
3 107 Neb. at 830, 187 N.W. at 76 (1922). However, the Supreme Court
did permit the balance of the judgment to stand upon the condition
that the plaintiff file a remittitur in the amount of the doctor and
hospital bills.
4 Becker v. Haysworth, 157 Neb. 353, 59 N.W.2d 560 (1953).
G 161 Neb. 35, 71 N.W.2d 701 (1955).
6 161 Neb. at 54, 71 N.W.2d at 714 (1955).
7 See 82 A.L.R. 1325 for an exhaustive annotation on this subject.
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tually eliminated by pre-trial conference, demand for admission,
and discovery procedure. Nonetheless, the Nebraska rule ap-
pears to be that if doctor, hospital, and funeral bills have not
otherwise been agreed upon as a proper item of damages, there
must be proof that the amount paid or charged is reasonable if
opposing counsel objects to the introduction of the statement for
services or receipt.
8
B. Hoxm NtmsING.
Although the author has found no Nebraska cases upon this
specific item of special damages, the matter has been decided
in a number of neighboring jurisdictions. It appears that the
general rule is that the reasonable value of nursing at home is
an element of damages recoverable in a personal injury case,
even though such nursing is rendered by a member of the plain-
tiff's family without expectation of payment.9
The Wisconsin cases' 0 specifically hold that a recovery al-
lowed for the value of the wife's services for nursing a child
at home cannot exceed the amount for which another could have
been employed to do the same work. If this is the rule, it is
conceivable that a difficult problem of proof and jury instruction
might arise in this area. The value of personal, but non-profes-
sional, services such as these are subject to a wide variety of
conjecture and would, in all probability, open the door to a wide
variety of opinion; providing, of course, that such opinion is
even admissible to establish this type of proof.
C. PROTHESIS.
Very little law on the subject of prothesis is readily avail-
able. Generally, it is said that the same rule should be followed
8 This rule appears somewhat silly, for it is hard to conceive of any
doctor, hospital administrator, or undertaker who would n 6 t testify
that his bill is reasonable in all respects, and it would be a rare case,
indeed, where counsel could find another member of the fraternity
to refute it.
9 Iowa: Strand v. Automobile Garage Company, 136 Iowa 68, 113 N.W.
88 (1907); Scurlock v. City of Boone, 142 Iowa 684, 121 N.W. 369
(1909); Legler v. Muscatine Clinic, 207 Iowa 720, 223 N.W. 405
(1929) ;
Minn: Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball and Athletic Assn., 122 Minn.
327, 142 N.W. 706 (1913);
Wisc: Johnson v. St. Paul S. W. Coal Co., 131 Wisc. 627, 111 N.W. 722
(1907); Callies v. Reliance Laundry, 188 Wisc. 376, 206 N.W. 198
(1925).
10 Supra, note 9.
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that is used in establishing damages to other personal property.1 1
Apparently, no damages are permitted for the purchase of artificial
limbs if their need is the result of the accident for which damages
are sought. In other words, should your client lose a limb in a
recoverable accident, his measure of damages is for the loss of
the limb, pain and suffering, medical expenses, and other special
damages; no additional recovery for the cost of an artificial limb.
III. REPLACEMENT HELP
No Nebraska cases directly in point upon this subject have
been found. In Iowa, however, it has been specifically held
that a plaintiff may recover, as part of his damages for personal
injury, money expended in hiring a man to attend his business
or wages which the plaintiff is obligated to pay a substitute dur-
ing his confinement or incapacity.' 2  However, to warrant re-
covery of such items, the Iowa Court requires proof of the fact
that such help was necessary, and the reasonable value of the
services must be shown.
While there is a conflict of authority as to whether the hir-
ing of substitute help should be considered as an independent
item of damages or should be considered in connection with
proof of damages for the plaintiffs' loss of time and earnings, the
weight of authority appears to follow the Iowa Court; holding
that the cost of hiring a substitute during incapacity of an in-
jured person is allowable as an independent item of damages in
a personal injury action. Some jurisdictions hold that such cost
must be alleged in the petition as a special item of damage and
a failure to do so will result in the inadmissibility of the evidence
pertinent thereto, while others, including Iowa, hold that evidence
of such cost is admissible as proof of damage even though the
cost is not separately set out in the petition.'3
IV. THE COLLATERAL BENEFITS RULE
Simply stated, the Collateral Benefits Rule provides that where,
because of an injury, the injured person receives something
which he would not otherwise receive, then such addition should
be considered by the Court or jury in assessing the amount of
11 25 C.J.S., Damages, § 48.
12 Sexton v. Lauman, 244 Ia. 200, 57 N.W.2d 200 (1953).
13 Sexton v. Lauman, note 12 supra, annotated at 27 A.L.R.2d 353.
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his damages by reason of the injury. The problem may be readily
seen in the following examples:
1. Suppose that A is injured and out of work for a period of
30 days, but receives his full wages while off work by
reason of a sick or disability leave clause in his employ-
ment contract. In addition, he receives further compensa-
tion from medical and disability insurance. The result is
that he is now receiving more compensation than he nor-
mally receives while working. Should the jury be advised
of this fact and instructed to consider it in assessing dam-
mages?
2. Suppose that a widow brings an action under the wrong-
ful death statute for the loss of her husband. Should her
recovery be affected by the fact that she is the beneficiary
of an insurance policy, the sole heir of his estate, or the
receipient of a pension or death benefit which accrues
by reason of his death?
In Nebraska, there appear to be no cases directly in point.
It is academic, however, that life, or hospital, or disability insur-
ance is not considered in Nebraska, and, by the great weight of
authority in the United States, 14 it is held that wages paid dur-
ing a period of disability, either gratuitously or by contract, do
not affect the plaintiff's recover against the responsible defend-
ant. The reasoning in these cases is clear; a tort-feasor should
not be able to take advantage of his own wrong in order to miti-
gate the damages in any way.
V. FUTURE EXPENSES
Subject to the well known rule prohibiting remote or spec-
ulative damages, virtually every jurisdiction permits recovery
for all anticipated future expenses. Though no Nebraska case
in point has been found, it is known that, as a practical matter,
future medical and other type expenses are often pled and al-
lowed, subject to proof of reasonable certainty and the require-
ments of the speculative damages rule.
The Supreme Court of Iowa has recognized the need for con-
sidering future expenses, stating:
Future expenses reasonably necessary often form part of the
measure of damages in serious injury cases. 15
14 18 A.L.R. 678, 95 A.L.R. 575, 19 AJL.R.2d 557, 63 Harv. Law Rev. 330.
15 Salinger v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 147 Ia. 486, 126 N.W. 362
(1910).
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Were the rule otherwise, it is obvious that a seriously injured
plaintiff would have to wait until he had completely recovered
before recovering the maximum damages. The permanently in-
jured plaintiff requiring continuous medical or other type of care
would face a complete dilemma. Should he wait until a major por-
tion of his expenses are ascertained, he might wait beyond the per-
iod of the statute of limitations; should be bring an action before
the statute has run, he would be prohibited from recovering fu-
ture expenses. Because any such result should be eliminated,
it is clear that the existing rule is the proper one.
VI. FUNERAL EXPENSES
At common law and under the English rule, funeral expenses
were held not to be recoverable in an action for wrongful death.
This reasoning was based on one of two theories: First, that the
defendant should not be required to pay funeral expenses since
all persons utimately died, and there would be funeral bills any-
way; Second, that since the wrongful death action is based upon
the principle that only the next-of-kin have an action in cises
where the deceased would have had an action had he or she sur-
vived, and had the deceased survived he or she should not have
an action for personal funeral expenses, that therefore such dam-
ages should not survive.
In the United States, however, the majority view opposes
the view of the English common law:
Funeral expenses are generaly held to be a legitimate element
of damages, at least when paid by one of the beneficiaries who
was under an obligation to pay them.' 6
Killion v. Dinklege17 is the classic Nebraska case holding
that funeral expenses are properly an item of damages. There,
a minor son was killed and the father, as Administrator, brought
an action, for the benefit of himself and his wife, the deceased's
mother. After fully discussing the various reasons why courts
had or had not permitted recovery for funeral expenses, the
Court held that, since it is the duty of parents to bury their
deceased minor children and since there is a presumption that a
minor child will live to majority, when the parents would not
be called upon to pay the funeral expenses, the parent was en-
titled to recover the funeral expenses.
16 Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act, § 157, p. 185.
17 121 Neb. 322, 236 N.W. 757 (1931).
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In Kroeger v. Safranek,18 decided in 1955, an Administratrix
sought damages, for the death of her husband, for the benefit of
herself and a minor daughter. Although reversed and remanded
on other grounds, the Court specifically recognized the majority
rule of the United States in permitting the recovery of funeral
expenses when they have been paid by the beneficiary or bene-
ficiaries for whom the action is brought, or when the benefic-
iaries have legally obligated themselves to pay such expenses. This
rule is also followed in Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and North Dakota. 19
The Kroeger Case20 also pointed out that the best procedure
for recovering funeral expenses is a separate cause of action
brought for them, so that, if the jury should allow the recovery,
the amount will be separate from other damages. This allows
easy distribution to the beneficiaries who have paid such ex-
penses, or legally obligated themselves to pay the same. In view
of the statutory language, this would appear to be good law.
VII. CONCLUSION
The attorney will encounter little trouble with special dam-
ages if he remembers that any special loss incurred by reason
of another's negligence may ordinarily be recovered, provided
that the loss has been properly pled and proven in a manner
sufficient to overcome the rule prohibiting the recovery of re-
mote or speculative damages.
18 161 Neb. 182, 72 N.W.2d 831 (1955).
19 94 A.L.R. 441.
20 Supra, note 18.
